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Goeke: Goeke: Substantive and Procedural Due Process

Substantive and Procedural Due Process
for Unaccompanied Alien Juveniles
Reno v. Flores'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Approximately seventy percent of the juveniles arrested for violation of
immigration laws are unaccompanied by their parents or guardians.2 Many
are refugees from Central America, sent ahead of their parents for safety
reasons, or separated from their families during flight Prior to 1984, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") allowed release of these
unaccompanied children to another responsible adult on the assurance that the
adult would bring the child to court when required.4 In 1984, the Western
Regional Office of the INS adopted the policy that minors in deportation
proceedings would only be released to a parent or lawful guardian, except in
"unusual and extraordinary cases."5 Reno v. Flores was a class action suit
brought in response to the INS policy change and in protest of conditions at
places of detention.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Jenny Lisette Flores, a sixteen year old from El Salvador, was one of
four representatives of the class consisting of "all aliens under the age of 18
who are detained by the INS Western Region because a parent or legal
guardian fails to appear personally to take custody of them."6 Flores'

1. 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993).
2. Id. at 1443.
3. Michael A. Olivas, Unaccompanied Refugee Children: Detention, Due
Process,and Disgrace,2 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 159, 160 (1990).
4. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1460.
5. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1439

(1993).
6. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1444. See Beth S. Rose, Comment, INS Detention of
AlienMinors: The Flores Challenge, 1 GEo. IMMIcRG L.J. 329, 331 (1986). The other
plaintiffs were also female and from El Salvador: Dominga Hernandez, Alma Yanira
Cruz-Aldama, and Ana Martinez-Portillo. Allwere between ages thirteen and sixteen.

Id.
The possibility of arrest can keep parents from making a personal appearance to
take custody of their children. In the Western Region when undocumented parents
claimed their children, they were subject to immediate arrest and initiation of
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complaint challenged the INS release policy on constitutional, statutory, and
international law grounds, and objected to conditions of detention. The
Federal District Court, Central District of California, granted partial summary
judgment to the INS on statutory and international law grounds. A consent

decree settled the detention condition claims.' The District Court granted
Flores partial summary judgment on an equal protection claim, finding that the
release policy differentiated for no rational reason between deportation and

deportation proceedings. Flores v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991, 1023 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Fletcher, J., dissenting), vacated, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
1439 (1993). Flores' mother was in the United States but feared deportation back to
El Salvador if she appeared to accept custody of her daughter. Rose, supra,at 331
(citing First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, and Relief in
the Nature of Mandamus at 12, Flores v. Meese, (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 1985) (No. 854544)).
7. Before the consent decree, refugee children were detained in barbed-wire
enclosed camps inrural Texas, Arizona, and California. "Predictably, the facilities are
squalid: one site in Texas has been sardonically dubbed 'El Corralon' (The Corral),
while another is a former Department of Agriculture pesticide storage facility. Aliens
are fenced into shacks,tents, and makeshift shelterswhich are more dangerous and less
habitable than those that detained Japanese Americans during World War II." Olivas,
supranote 3, at 160. Justice Stevens quoted a consultant to the U.S. Department of
Justice who described the detention facilities as "jail-like .... barracks ... secured
through the use of fences, barbed wire, automatic locks, observation areas, etc."
Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1461 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Judge Fletcher, in her dissent from the first Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision, stated that "none of the facilities.., had minimally acceptable services for
children.., none had specially trained staff, adequate educational programs, adequate
recreational programs, adequate medical services, privacy, appropriate menus .... The
norm for each program was sterility, boredom, and confinement." MichaelG. Bersani,
Flores v. Meese:
Playing Hide and Seek with the Right to Physical
Freedom-ChildrenTeach the NS the ABC 's of Due Process,43 SYRACUSE L. REV.
867, 873 (1992) (quoting Flores,934 F.2d at 1023 (Fletcher, J., dissenting)). Children
were commingled with adults of the opposite sex and subjected to strip searches.
Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1461 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
After the consent decree, detained children had to be housed in facilities that met
state licensing requirements for foster care or group care. Id. at 1445. The facilities,
while run "'in an open type of setting without a need for extraordinary security
measures,' ... 'are required to design programs and strategies to discourage runaways
and prevent the unauthorized absence of minors in care."' Id. at 1458 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Memorandum of Understanding Re Compromise of Class Action:
Conditions of Detention, Flores v. Meese, (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 1987) (No. 85-4544-

RJK (Px))).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/10
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exclusion, and deferred due process claims until new regulations were

devised.8
The INS responded with a new rule for detention and release ofjuveniles
for deportation and exclusion purposes, which eliminated the equal protection
deficiency that the District Court had found.' After the rule went into effect,
the District Court granted summary judgment to Flores on due process
grounds and invalidated the regulation.10
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding
the INS did not exceed its statutory authority in issuing the regulation, the
regulation did not violate substantive due process, and probable cause review
was not required by the Fourth Amendment prior to extended detention."
The Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc, vacated the panel decision, and
affirmed the District Court. The court held that the INS exceeded its authority
by promulgating rules addressing child welfare, an area outside agency
expertise, thus deserving no deference from the court; the detention policy
violated a fundamental liberty interest; and the procedural requirements
imposed by the District Court were appropriate."2
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
holding: (1) alien juveniles do not have a fundamental right to private
placement; (2) procedural due process does not require an individualized
determination of the best interest of the child; and (3) INS Regulation 242.24
does not facially exceed the Attorney General's discretion to set terms for the
release of arrested aliens.

8. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1444. "Exclusion proceedings, which are not at issue in
the present case, involve aliens apprehended before 'entering' the United States, as that

term is used in immigration laws." Id. at 1444 n.2.
9. 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (1992). See Detention and Release of Juveniles, 53 Fed.

Reg. 17,449 (1988).
10. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1444. The District Court's opinion was unpublished.
Flores v. Meese, No. CV 85-4544-RJK (C.D. Cal. May 25, 1988).
The District Court ordered the INS to release juveniles to other responsible adults
if a parent or guardian was unavailable. Unrelated custodians were not to be required
to agree formally to any obligation beyond assuring the child's attendance at court

proceedings. The court ordered that a judicial hearing on probable cause and release
restrictions be held whether or not the juvenile requested it. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at

1444.
11. Flores, 934 F.2d at 991.
12. Flores,942 F.2d at 1365.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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IH. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Fundamental Rights of Children
Children's rights have developed from the common law viewpoint that
children were property of their parents 3 to the recognition that, as persons,
they enjoy some constitutional protection, 4 though the scope of those rights
is uncertain."5 Toward the end of the last century, separate juvenile justice
systems were adopted with the intent to treat rather than punish offenders,
asserting government's parens patriae6 interest to act in a parental role for
the best interest of the child.' Such benevolent intentions denied children
due process rights otherwise possessed by adults."8
Within the last thirty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has identified certain
procedures that due process of law demands be extended to children. In In re
Gault, the Court criticized parens patriae which in practice resulted in
arbitrariness and "unbridled discretion."' 9 The Court has determined that the
Constitution requires juveniles be notified of charges, allowed counsel,
allowed the privilege against self incrimination, granted the right to confront

13. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Gerstien
v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976). See Sarah H. Clark, Casenote, SubstantiveDue Process
in a State of Flux: Should Courts Develop New Fundamental Rights for Alien
Children?,72 B.U. L. REv. 579, 585 (1992).
14. Bellottiv. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) ("[a] child, merely on account of
his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution."); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 13 (1967) ("whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.").
15. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (quoting in part Gault,387 U.S.
at 131-14) ("There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable in juvenile
proceedings. 'The problem,' we have stressed, 'is to ascertain the precise impact of
the due process requirement upon such proceedings."').
16. Black's Law Dictionary definesparenspatriaeas "the principle that the state
must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack
proper care and custody from their parents." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th
ed. 1990).

17. Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
18. Id. at 17.
19. Id. at 18. "The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with
those of our juvenile courts .... ." Id. (quoting Dean Pound, Forewordto PAULINE
v. YOUNG, SociAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY xxvii (1937)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/10
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and cross examine witnesses,20 convicted only on proof beyond a reasonable
doubt,21 and protected from double jeopardy.22
However, not all adult procedural rights apply to children. Juveniles are
not entitled to jury trials' or to habeas corpus relief from pretrial
detention. 4 In Schall v. Martin, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a
juvenile's liberty interest in freedom from institutionalization before trial.'
The Court "subordinated [that interest] to the State's parenspatriae interest
in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child."26 The Schall court
minimized the child's liberty interest by observing that children "are always
in some form of custody."'27 The Court imposed some procedural safeguards
on pretrial detention, requiring it to be preventive rather than punitive, and
requiring a probable cause hearing to be held within a reasonable time after
commencement of the detention.28
Outside of the context of criminal29 behavior, the Supreme Court has
ruled that a minor resisting commitment to a mental institution has a
"substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily"30 but that the
child's parents could limit this freedom by their interest in the child's
welfare. 1 As in the pretrial detention setting, limitation on freedom from
bodily restraint is not absolute, but subject to certain procedural safeguards. 2

20. Schall, 467 U.S. at 263 (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 30, 33-34, 41, 55-57). See

also Thomas A. Bockhorst, The Constitutionalityof INS Pre-HearingDetention of
Alien Children,62 U. CIN. L. REv. 217, 227 (1993).
21. Schall, 467 U.S. at 263 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970)). See
also Alfredo A. v. Superior Court, 865 P.2d 56, 64 (Cal. 1994).

22. Schall, 467 U.S. at 263 (citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975)).
See also Alfredo A, 865 P.2d at 64.
23. Schall, 467 U.S. at 263 (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545
(1978)).
24. Id. at 255-57.
25. Id. at 265.
26. Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)).
27. Id. (citing Lehmanv. Lycoming County Children's Servs., 458 U.S. 502,51011(1982)).
28. Id. at 269-70.
29. "Criminal" is technically incorrect since juvenile proceedings are considered

civil rather than criminal, a classification distinctionwhichresulted in procedural rights
being denied children. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.

30. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
31. Id. at 604.
32. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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Thus, children's constitutional rights, while recognized, are subject to more
restriction than corresponding rights of adults.33
B. FundamentalRights of Illegal Aliens
Like children, illegal aliens have been acknowledged to possess some
constitutional rights,34 but these are less extensive than those afforded to
citizens. 5 A major rationale for the different treatment of aliens is the
plenary power doctrine dictating that courts defer to the political branches in
matters concerning immigration." This doctrine is based upon the express
37
constitutional power of Congress to set "a uniform Rule of Naturalization;"
38
the inherent power of the United States to control its borders; and the
expertise of the INS in immigration matters.39
In spite of the deference given Congress through delegation to the
Attorney General and the INS in the area of immigration, the courts have set
some limits regarding due process for aliens.4" In Carlson v. Landon, the
Court upheld pre-deportation detention of accused Communist Party members
based on their threat to national security." Furthermore, in INS v. National
Centerfor Immigrants 'Rights, the Court upheld an INS no-work condition for
bail pending deportation proceedings based on Congressional intent to protect
the jobs of citizens.4"
The Court's justification of INS procedures based on specified
congressional policies has led some to suggest that the INS exceeds its
33. The Courtjustified the different constitutionaltreatment of children and adults
because of "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
child rearing." Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
34. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
35. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976).
36. Id. at 81 n.17 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89
(1952)). But see Bersani, supra note 7, at 896 n.196.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See Bersani, supra note 7, at 895.
38. See Bersani, supranote 7, at 895. See also United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).

39. See Carlsonv. Landon, 342 U.S. 524,540-41(1952). See also Bersani, supra
note 7, at 896.
40. See INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, 501 U.S. 183, 187-88, 19394 (1991) [hereinafter NClR]; Carlson,342 U.S. at 528, 541; Bockhorst, supra note
20, at 222.

41. Carlson,342 U.S. at 541-42.
42. NCIR, 501 U.S. at 187-88, 193-94. "No work" refers to the policy of barring
an alien from employment as a condition for release on bail. Bockhorst, supra note
20, at 224.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/10
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authority when those reasons do not exist.43 Specifically, courts have
focused on risk of flight or danger to the public as reasons to allow predeportation hearings."
IV. INSTANT DECISION

A. Majority Opinion
In the instant case, the Court found that Flores' challenge to the INS
regulation was facial. 5 Such a facial challenge requires that no set of
circumstances exists under which the regulation would be valid before
plaintiffs can prevail.4 ' Following this standard, the Court determined that
a printed notice offering the detained child an opportunity for a hearing if the
child requested one satisfied procedural due process requirements. The court
reasoned, "[ilt has not been shown that all of them are too young or too
ignorant to exercise that right when the form asking them to assert or waive
it is presented." 47 Thus, if one child was mature or knowledgeable enough
to understand the notice, it satisfied procedural due process demands.
Justice Scalia, writing for the seven member majority, narrowly
characterized the right in question 8 not as "freedom from physical
restraint"49 but as "the alleged right of a child who has no available parent,
close relative, or legal guardian, and for whom the government is responsible,
to be placed in the custody of a willing-and-able private custodian rather than

43. See Bockhorst,supranote 20, at 225 & n.60 (citing Federal Court of Appeals
cases for support).
44. Potash v. District Director of Immigration & Naturalization, 169 F.2d 747,
751-52 (2d Cir. 1948).
45. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1446.
46. Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).

47. Id. at 1451.
48. The Court has expressedjudicial selfrestraint in substantive due process cases

by narrowly construing the right being claimed. "The doctrine ofjudicial self-restraint
requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground
in this field. It is important, therefore, to focus on the allegations in the complaint to

determine how petitioner describes the constitutional right at stake ...." Collins v.
City of Harker Heights, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992).
Characterization of liberty interests becomes critical. The level of generality at
which the court characterizes the issue will determine whether the right will be found

fundamental; thus, whether the government action will be subjected to strict scrutiny
or rational basis review. See Clark, supra note 13, at 596-97.
49. Justice Scalia quoted respondents' brief as asserting "that alien juveniles

suspected of being deportable have a 'fundamental' right to 'freedom from physical

restraint."' Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1446.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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50
of a government-operated or government-selected child-care institution.
The Court rejected the physical restraint characterizationbecause children are
always in someone's custody" and because, under the terms of the consent
agreement, the conditions of confinement do not constitute punishment. 2
The majority regarded the right to private custody for children as too
novel to be considered fundamental, and warned of difficult application in
contexts other than law enforcement, such as state care of orphans and
abandoned children." Because the liberty interest was deemed not to be
fundamental,54 the Court examined the INS regulation under a rational basis
standard, recognizing the agency's propounded interest in the welfare of the
child as being rationally connected to a legitimate government interest.55
Flores had argued that, at a minimum, due process required an
individualized hearing focusing on whether release to a responsible adult or
holding the child in state custody was in the best interest of the child."6 The
majority asserted that the best interest of the child standard applied as the sole

criterion for judgment only between parents in custody disputes.57 The Court
found when children's interests conflict with those of guardians, other

50. Id. at 1447.

51. Id. (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)).
52. Id. at 1446-47.
53. Id. at 1447.
54. An interest must be deemed fundamental to merit strict scrutiny.
As one prominent treatise states, 'The list of rights which the Court has
found to be fundamental, and, therefore, worthy of strict judicial scrutiny,
is not a long one.' The 'fundamental rights' these scholars list are freedom
of association; right to vote; right to interstate travel; right to privacy
involving marital decisions; child bearing and child rearing.
Doe v. Taylor Independent School Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 479 n.6 (5th Cir, 1994) (Jones,
J., dissenting) (quoting RONALD D. ROTUNDA AND JOHN E. NOwvAK, 2 THE TREATISE
OF CONSTirTIONAL LAW § 15.7 at 434 (2d ed. 1992)).
"Apart from abortion-related cases, the Court has not upheld a new substantive
due process claim since 1977." Doe, 15 F.3d at 479, n.6 (Jones, J., dissenting).
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court.
There are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to
certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the more specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history of the Lochner era
demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial
intervention become the predilections of those who happen at the time to
be Members of this Court.
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
55. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1448.

56. Id.
57. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/10
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children, or government resources, the best interest of the child standard is too
restrictive." "Minimum standards must be met, and the child's fundamental
rights must not be impaired; but the decision to go beyond those
requirements-to give one or another of the child's additional interests priority
over other concerns that compete for public funds and administrative
attention-is a policy judgment rather than a constitutional imperative."59 The
Court characterizedthe best interest argument as a demand for least restrictive
means analysis, while a reasonable fit was all that was required since the right
involved was not fundamental.6'
After denying that children have a fundamental right to avoid
institutionalization when a responsible adult is willing to assume custody, the
Court further minimized Flores' claims by pointing to the claimants' probable
illegal alien status. Judicial deference to political branches in immigration
matters and the congressional grant of discretion to the Attorney General
concerning terms of detention bolstered the rational basis underlying the
policy."'
The Court found procedural due process satisfied by the notice of a right
to a hearing on request and the revocable nature of the waiver.62 Justice
Scalia wrote, "[w]e have held that juveniles are capable of 'knowingly and

intelligently' waiving their right against self-incrimination in criminal
cases. 6i S Therefore, they should also be competent to waive the right to an
individual hearing.'
The INS regulation was not beyond the discretion of the Attorney
General because it "rationally pursues a purpose that is lawful for the INS to
seek.16 ' The given purpose of the INS regulation was "concern for the
However, "[b]ecause the regulation involves no
welfare of the child."'

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1448-49.
61. Id. at 1449 (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,792 (1977); Matthews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1951); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a) (1988)).
62. See supranote 47 and accompanying text.
63. Flores, 113 S.Ct. at 1451 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-27
(1979); United States v. Saucedo-Velasquez, 843 F.2d 832, 835 (5th Cir 1988)).
64. Id.
65. Id.

66. Id. The agency cited its limited expertise and resources for conducting home
studies prior to placement with a non-parent as reasons for the regulation. Id.;
Detention and Release of Juveniles, 53 Fed. Reg. 17449, 17449 (1988). "Home
studies" refers to the evaluation carried out by state agencies prior to adoption.
Prospective parents' financial situation, health, and motivation for adoption are
investigated through interviews and home visits. ROBERT H. MNooKIN & D. KELLY
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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deprivation of a 'fundamental' right, the Service was not compelled to ignore
the costs and difficulty of alternative means of advancing its declared goal."67
The INS is not held to the least restrictive means for pursuing its lawful
purpose.6
The "'blanket' presumption of the unsuitability of custodians other than
parents" was acceptable because generic rules and presumptions are allowed
when a non-fundamental right is involved.69 While the INS policy might not
be the best possible response to the arrest of unaccompanied juveniles,
the
70
Court found that it does not violate the Constitution or the statute.
B. ConcurringOpinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Souter, concurred in the decision but
asserted the conviction that children do "have a core liberty interest in
remaining free from institutional confinement" that is "no narrower than an
adult's."7' The concurring Justices called for heightened scrutiny whenever
government institutionalization is implicated, regardless of the conditions of
confinement. 2 Justice O'Connor stated that the Due Process Clause requires
strict scrutiny in these instances because "[i]nstitutionalization is a decisive and
unusual event" with tragic consequences when erroneously applied to
children.73 The purpose of strict scrutiny is to assure requisite care, rather
than prevent institutionalization altogether. 4
Although the concurring Justices disagreed with the majority about the
characterizationof the liberty interest as non-fundamental, they still supported
the outcome of the decision. Based on the provisions of the consent
agreement, the facial nature of the challenge to the regulation, and the
unavailability of normal custody arrangements, the INS regulation satisfied

WEISBBRG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 692-93 (2d ed. 1989).
67. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1452. The Court compared this outcome to the
obligation to follow costlier procedures when a fundamental right is involved as in

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972) (concerning the rights of a natural
parent in a custody proceeding). Id.
68. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1452.
69. Id. at 1453 (citing INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, 501 U.S. 183,

196 (1991)).
70. Id. at 1454. The statute referred to is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1988), which
grants discretion to the Attorney General over terms of detention of suspected illegal
aliens. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
71. Flores, 113 S.Ct. at 1454 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1455 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 1456 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/10
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due process scrutiny because the purpose of confinement was legitimately the
welfare of the child." However, if the stated purpose of the INS regulation
had been administrative costs or convenience, these Justices would not have
concurred in the outcome.76
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, disagreed with the majority
on all three elements of the holding. Justice Stevens characterized the case as
one concerning the indefinite detention of children who presented no risk of
flight nor threat to themselves or others. 7 The dissent questioned the stated
purposes of the INS regulation, arguing that the welfare of the child could not
have been the reason for the regulation in light of the deplorable conditions
of confinement when the regulation was promulgated.7"
The dissent challenged the regulation on both statutory and constitutional
grounds. Justice Stevens analyzed the statute granting the Attorney General
discretion over detention pending deportation hearings in the context of two
considerations suggested by case law. The discretion exercised over detention
must comport with congressional policy, and the statute must be given
restrictive meaning if a broader reading raises constitutional concerns.79 The
dissenters cited Carlson and NCIR as instances when the Court upheld INS
detention of aliens in pursuit of congressional policy.8" In contrast to the
explicit policies supporting detention in those cases, Justice Stevens found
congressional intent concerning federal detention of juveniles contrary to the
INS regulation at issue here. He pointed to the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act81 showing congressional preference for release
of juveniles to a responsible party rather than detention.' Furthermore, since

75. Id.
76. Id.

77. Id. at 1457-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1460-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("How a responsible administrator
could possibly conclude that the practice of commingling harmless children with adults
of the opposite sex in detention centers protected by barbed-wire fences, without
providing them with education, recreation, or visitation, while subjecting them to
arbitrary strip searches, would be in their best interests is most difficult to

comprehend."). See supranote 7.
79. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1464-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id. See supranotes 41-42 and accompanying text.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 5034 (1988).
82. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1465 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 931011, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1974), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283 ("[Section
504] established a presumption for release of the juvenile.")). "In my view, Congress
has spoken on the detention of juveniles, and has rejected the very presumption upon
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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"the detention of juveniles on the basis of a general presumption as to the
suitability of particular custodians without an individualized determination as
to whether that presumption bears any relationship at all to the facts of a
particular case implicates an interest at the very core of the Due Process
Clause."'
Thus, statutes authorizing discretion should be construed
narrowly.'
Justice Stevens agreed with Justice O'Connor that a fundamental liberty
interest, freedom from physical restraint, was at issue." Since the right was
fundamental, the blanket rule proscribing release to other than parents,
guardians, or certain other close relatives was not focused narrowly enough
to serve government's legitimate interest in the welfare of the children.86
Due process requires an individualized determination that detention actually
serves that legitimate purpose."
Finally, Justice Stevens compared the instant decision allowing detention
without individualized hearing to the Japanese internment case," Korematsu
v. United States.89

In Korematsu, there the Court allowed "serious

infringement of individual liberty without requiring a case-by-case
determination as to whether such an infringement was in fact necessary to
effect the Government's compelling interest in national security."9

which the INS relies." Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1467 (Stevens, J.dissenting).

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1468 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1469 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens pointed to a long line of
cases supporting the need for an individualized determination: Foucha v. Louisiana,
112 S. Ct. 1780, 1786 (1992) (holding that one detained for "dangerousness" must
have an adversary hearing to prove danger to the community); Salerno, 481 U.S. at
742 (hearing necessary to determine if threat of flight or danger); Schall, 467 U.S. at
263 (same as Salernoinjuvenile context); Gersteinv. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975)
(probable cause hearing required for detention); Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S.
366, 376 (1956) (federal custody after judicial finding of incompetency).
88. Flores, 113 S.Ct. at 1469 n.30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

89. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
90. Flores, 113 S.Ct. at 1469 n.30 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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Considering the disdain that war-time decision later received, 91 Justice
Stevens cautioned the Court against following that precedent.'

V. COMMENT
As Americans, we pride ourselves on being citizens of the bulwark of
freedom and democracy. It hardly comports with our national self-image that
children who flee oppressive regimes find themselves subject to confinement
in this country without an individual hearing. One commentator asserts, "By
the time these children make it past the U.S. border, many of them have
suffered terribly at the hands of adults along their entire journey. Their
current treatment by the INS continues this pattern of abuse."'93

The Court narrowed the focus of the liberty interest in this case to
prevent classification of the rights at issue as fundamental.94 It is
counterintuitive that freedom from physical restraint can be described so
specifically that it is not considered fundamental, thus not protected by
substantive due process. At the very least, liberty in the United States is a
freedom from physical restraint. Violation of that freedom is a violation of
the most basic concept of liberty. It is somewhat reassuring that four Justices
regard freedom from needless institutional confinement a core liberty implicit
in the Due Process Clause and find that this freedom extends to children.95
The majority's reluctance to find a fundamental right was not due to one
factor, but to an interplay of judicial self restraint, 6 deference to the political

91. Congress paid reparations to Japanese-Americans who suffered from the

Japanese internment policy upheld in Korematsu. Restitution for World War II
Internment of Japanese Americans and Aleuts, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903
(1988); Flores,113 S. Ct. at 1469 n.30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Professor Olivas calls
the internment "one of the most shameful episodes in twentieth-century United States
history. The decision to place the Japanese in 'war relocation centers,' ratified by the
U.S. Supreme Court in a now-discredited decision, Korematsu v. United States, is
widely regarded as an embarrassment, 'a mistake of terrifically horrible proportions,'
and a 'tragic momentum of the times."' Michael A. Olivas, "Breakingthe Law" on
Principle: An Essay on Lawyers'Dilemmas, UnpopularCauses, and Legal Regimes,
52 U. Prr. L. REv. 815, 820 (1991) (quoting John Hersey, A Mistake of Terrifically
HorribleProportions, in JOHN ARMOR & PETmR WRIGHT, MANZANAR 3, 10, 58

(1988)).
92. Flores, 113 S.Ct. at 1469.
93. Olivas, supra note 3, at 159-60 (referring to due process deficiencies, the
living conditions in detention camps, and the need for guardians ad litem to assist
juveniles obtain the legal services they required).
94. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 71, 85-87 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 48.
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branches in matters of immigration,' and the less certain scope of liberties
of aliens and children. 8 However, the Court was unclear as to the weight
each factor should be accorded. If the plenary power doctrine99 in
immigration matters was the primary reason for the outcome, the broad
language about child protectionparenspatriae,and the limited use of the best
interest of the child standard should have been unnecessary. Unfortunately,
inclusion of this language could have effects well beyond this specific case.
The limitation of the best interest of the child standard in Flores has
implications far beyond detention of suspected illegal alien juveniles. The role
of the best interest of the child standard is a crucial consideration in conflicts
between adoptive and biological parents."' 0 Careful thought should be given
to the proper use of the best interest of the child standard when liberties
conflict.
Ironically, although the Court decided the best interest of the child did
not determine whether unaccompanied children should be released or detained,
the welfare of the child was the government interest that justified continued
custody of the child. 0 1 While the welfare of the child is a legitimate
government interest, no showing that the interest is actually furthered by the
policy is demanded. If it had been required, the INS policy would not have
met the burden because detention is harmful to children. 1" The potential
harmful effects of detention is a reason that federal policy toward detention
of juveniles accused of criminal conduct (rather than illegal alien status)
allows* release to responsible adults, not just the small list of qualified
custodians in the INS regulation. 3 In fact, the majority might have found

97. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 14-15, 34-35 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.

100. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Schmidt, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (the
emotionally charged "Baby Jessica" decision).

101. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
102. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1455 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Institutionalization
is a decisive and unusual event. 'The consequences of an erroneous commitment
decision are more tragic where children are involved. [C]hildhood is a particularly
vulnerable time of life and children erroneously institutionalized during their formative

years may bear the scars for the rest of their lives."' Id. (quoting Parham v. J.R,, 442
U.S. 584, 627-28 (1979)). See supranote 78 and accompanying text.
103. See Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1459-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
cites the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 which authorized
release ofjuveniles charged with offenses "to his parents, guardian, custodian, or other
responsible party .... " Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 5034 (1988)). He listed the following

model acts and standards which support such a release policy: MODEL ACTS FOR
FAMILY COURTS AND STATE-LOCAL CHiDREN'S PROGRAMS 24 (U.S. Dept. of Health,

Education, and Welfare 1975); STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/10

14

Goeke: Goeke: Substantive and Procedural Due Process

1995]

DUE PROCESS FOR ALIEN JUVENILES

administrative convenience to be an adequate government interest supporting
the regulation."°
In the Gault decision, the Supreme Court discredited the continual
custody concept that produced juvenile systems which could act arbitrarily
with impunity because there were no effective procedural checks to impose
discipline on the system."0 5 Less than twenty years later, in Schall, the
Court resurrected the "always in some form of custody" rationale to justify
significant incursions on children's liberty." 6 However, even Schall
involved detention that required individual hearings. The FloresCourt diluted
an individual hearing into a check-off waiver of hearing printed on a standard
form in a7 language that quite likely is not even the child's primary
0
language.
It is difficult to understand why the INS so zealously guarded the nonrelease policy. Continued custody of unaccompanied children rather than
release to a responsible adult was a change from earlier nation-wide
practice.0 Under the Federal District Court's order, children presumably
were released pending appeal, yet no evidence was offered that this practice
actually harmed the released children. 9 Comments received by the INS
during the notice-and-comment period before the regulation was

JusTICE 299 (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Nat'l Advisory Comm. for Juvenile Justice &
Delinquency Prevention 1980); STANDARDS AND GOALS, CoRREcTIoNS 267 (Nat'l
Advisory Comm. of Criminal Justice 1973); STANDARiS RELATING

TO

NONCrMNAL

MISBEHAVIOR 41, 42 (Institute of Judicial Admin., A.B.A. 1982). Flores, 113 S. Ct.
at 1459 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He then listed state laws consistent with these
standards: ALA. CODE § 12-15-62 (1986); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-133 (1986); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-2310 (1989); IDAHo CODE § 16-1811.1(c) (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE
§ 232.19(2) (1987); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 610.200 (Michie 1990); ME. Rnv. STAT.
ANN., tit. 15, § 3203-A (Supp. 1992); MD. CTS. & JuD. PROc. CODE ANN.

§ 3-814(b)(1) (1989); MAss. GEN. LAWS § 119:67 (1969); MiSs. CODE
§ 43-21-301(4) (Supp. 1992); MiNN. STAT. § 260.171 (1992); NEB. Rnv.
§ 43-253 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.170 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT.
§ 169-B:14 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-600 (Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED

ANN.
STAT.

ANN.

LAWS
§ 26-7A-89 (1992); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 52.02 (Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-3a-29(3)(a) (1992). Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1459 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1967). See supra notes 18-19 and
accompanying text.
106. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 253 (1984) (citing Lehman v. Lycoming

County Children's Servs., 458 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1982)).
107. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
109. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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promulgated,"' and evidence from other federal agencies' practice point to
greater potential for harm by detention rather than release."' Costs of
continued custody were greater than costs of release, even if home studies or
individual hearings were conducted.'
Since the INS policy was more
costly than release, and since there was evidence that the policy was
counterproductive to the welfare of the child-the purpose stated by the
INS-the persistence of the INS in pursuing the policy must have a different
explanation.
The policy might have been a manifestation of the anti-immigration
sentiment in some parts of our society, most recently expressed by California
voters passing Proposition 187 and by the increased measures taken by the
Justice Department to seal off the border with Mexico."' Law enforcement
motives (children as bait for illegal alien parents),"' inducement to
voluntary deportation," 5 discouraging illegal entry to the country, concern
about liability for release to the wrong parties," 6 or protection of
immigration decision authority may be other factors behind this policy.
Whatever the ultimate reasons for the policy, because the Court has
refused to strike the INS presumption that government custody is better for
children than release to responsible adults, Congress or the Administration
should make it unmistakably clear that children in federal custody are to be
detained only as a last resort when willing responsible adults are available.
VI. CONCLUSION
A majority of the Supreme Court deferred to the INS at the expense of
liberty for unaccompanied children suspected of being illegal immigrants.
Pending deportation, these children are kept in detention at state expense
despite the availability of responsible adults willing to assume their custody.
110. 53 Fed. Reg. 17,449 (1988).
111. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1460 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1462 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. See, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, Keep Out, You Tired, You Poor.. ., TME, Oct. 3,
1994, at 46 ("In a country built by immigrants, it is a measure of the deep
dissatisfaction with the generosity of the welfare state that the public has seized on
aliens as the enemy within."); Margo Homblower, Making and Breaking Law,
California's sweeping ballot initiative against illegal immigrants wins big before

landing in court,TIME, Nov. 21, 1994, at 68; S.C. Gwynne, The UnwelcomeMat, As
the Proposition 187 debate roars, the U.S. begins an intensive effort to seal off a
2,000-mile border,TIME, Nov. 28, 1994, at 35.
114. See supra note 6.
115. Irene Scharf & Christine Hess, Comment, What Process is Due?

UnaccompaniedMinors'Rightsto DeportationHearings, 1988 DUKE L.J. 114, 114.
116. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1460 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Such detention of the weakest and most disempowered individuals is held not
to violate a fundamental right or the Due Process Clause. The state is not
required to act in the best interest of the child when there are competing
interests. The biblical admonition that we are judged by how we treat "the
least of these"-those with the lowest social position-should give policy

makers pause."n The nation cannot take pride in its treatment of the least
of these, our alien juveniles, within our borders.

GAIL QUICK GOEKE

117. Matthew 25:40 (King James) ("As ye have done it unto the least of these my
brethren, ye have done it unto me.").
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